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1. INTRODUCTION
The network industries cover a wide range
of activities such as electricity, gas, information
(sound and images), water, freight and passen-
ger transport. All of these are of great signifi-
cance in the current economy, as much of the
technological progress made in recent years is
channeled through them. What are involved are
industries that have traditionally operated under
limited degrees of competition owing, above all,
to the presence of sizeable economies of scale
and of natural monopoly factors. The monopo-
listic organisation of these activities first began
to be re-assessed in the Anglo-Saxon countries
in the eighties. This review was due, among
other reasons, to the influence of technological
changes altering their modus operandi and to
the possibility of singling out activities in the
same industry, as well as to the strong increase
in demand to which they have been subject. In
Europe, the development of the single market
also boosted the liberalisation of the network in-
dustries, albeit at an uneven rate across coun-
tries. Spain has participated in this process, sig-
nificantly amending and adding to the regulation
of various industries, including energy and tele-
phony.
The experience of the different countries
shows that heightened competition in the net-
work industries reduces prices, improves quali-
ty, widens the supply of goods and services,
and increases efficiency in the allocation of re-
sources. Further, the use of the goods and ser-
vices produced by these industries as inputs for
other productive branches enables the initial fall
in prices to bring about significant synergies,
whereby the gains in efficiency and the reduc-
tion in prices spread to other sectors of the
economy. The contribution of the ongoing liber-
alisation of these industries to price stability and
to growth in recent years has therefore been
most considerable.
This article, which seeks to provide informa-
tion on the process in recent years whereby
these industries have been opened up in Spain,
is structured as follows. The following section
briefly refers to the most significant regulatory
aspects raised by the opening up to competition
of the network industries and discusses the reg-
ulation-based initiatives that seek to smooth the
co-existence of monopoly activities with those
conducted on a competitive footing. The third
section discusses how these matters have been
resolved in Spain. The fourth section analyses
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certain direct effects on consumer prices of
heightened competition in the air transport,
telecommunications and electricity industries,
comparing their performance in Spain and in
the euro area. The fifth section performs a sim-
ulation with the Input-Output tables to assess
the impact of the some of these industries on
output prices in the Spanish economy. The arti-
cle closes with some brief conclusions.
2. CHIEF REGULATORY ASPECTS
OF THE LIBERALISATION OF
THE NETWORK INDUSTRIES
The main challenge facing network industry
regulators is how to organise activity in those
segments of the industry remaining outside the
reach of competition, so as to enable the entry
of new competitors. This aspect is fundamental
since the network industries show a high de-
gree of maturity that hinders the entry of new
participants. Moreover, liberalisation should not
give rise to a situation where certain consumers
may be denied access to those goods and ser-
vices considered as essential. It has been
sought to tackle this type of problem in several
ways, including most notably: establishing inde-
pendent regulator agencies; the unbundling of
the various activity segments; and with price
regulation and the setting in place of the so-
called universal service.
Indeed, in order to square consumer inter-
ests (low prices and quality services) with those
of shareholders (a profitable return on their in-
vestment), governments have established inde-
pendent regulators in some of the network in-
dustries undergoing liberalisation. The indepen-
dence of these agencies from political power
limits the risk of the regulator’s decisions being
affected by pressures of any type. Furthermore,
as the agencies are for specific industries, their
actions are based on a much deeper knowl-
edge of the actual conditions governing the in-
dustry in question.
The network industries have traditionally
been characterised by the vertical integration of
the various segments of activities of which they
are comprised (depending on the industry,
these may be production, wholesale distribu-
tion, retail distribution and commercialisation).
The main advantage of this type of organisation
is co-ordination, and its main drawback the pos-
sibility of using the structure to discriminate
against competitor firms in the liberalised seg-
ments. As a result, in many cases segregating
activities has been considered as the means to
ensure the existence of competition in these
segments. If it is decided to unbundle activities
as a means of fomenting competition, it must be
decided at which level this is to be done (ac-
counting, legal, a ceiling on ownership share or
total segregation).
Another previously mentioned fundamental
aspect of network industry regulation is the de-
termination of the pricing system for non-liber-
alised activities. Such a system should be de-
signed so as to encourage productive efficien-
cy, quality of service, technological change and
innovation. Likewise, in the liberalised activities,
it may be advisable temporarily to regulate the
prices of the incumbent operators, so as to en-
courage the entry of new firms. The choice of
procedure and of the prices subject to regula-
tion is not easy; among other reasons this is be-
cause the regulator does not have full informa-
tion. Table 1 shows some of the procedures
that may be used to regulate prices although,
as indicated in this table, they all have advan-
tages and disadvantages.
Lastly, so that the liberalisation of the net-
work industries should not mean that certain
consumers are denied access to specific basic
goods and services, what is known as universal
service has been established in some indus-
tries. The aim here is to oblige operators to sup-
ply all users – at affordable prices – with a se-
ries of services with a specific level of quality.
On many occasions it is further required that
prices should be uniform across different re-
gions and/or different types of consumers. The
two key issues relating to universal service are
the definition of the component services and
their financing.
3. THE LIBERALISATION
OF THE NETWORK INDUSTRIES
IN SPAIN: BASIC FEATURES
The opening up of the network industries in
Spain has been pursued gradually. In this pro-
cess the various segments of single industries
have been successively incorporated, following
pre-set liberalisation timetables. This strategy
has been used, for instance, in the liberalisation
of air transport, telecommunications, electricity,
natural gas and rail transport. In certain
telecommunications activities, such as basic or
mobile telephony, the increase in the number of
operators has also come about gradually. In the
electricity and natural gas industries, the possi-
bility of choosing a supplier has been confined
for the moment to large users, although it will
be extended step-by-step across the board to
all consumers.
The network industries in Spain have fol-
lowed various liberalisation arrangements, de-
pending on the particularities of each and on the
option chosen regarding the regulation of the fac-
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tors described in the preceding section. Indicated
below are several aspects: first, the industries in
which a sectoral regulatory agency has been es-
tablished; second, some of the measures applied
to encourage the emergence of new competitors;
third, the industries where unbundling has been
introduced and the extent thereof; fourth, how
prices have been regulated; and lastly, those in-
dustries in which universal service has been in-
troduced and how its financing has been ad-
dressed. Table 2 draws together the main char-
acteristics of this process and several illustrative
references are given in connection with the
telecommunications, electricity, liquid and
gaseous hydrocarbon (fuel and natural gas), rail-
way transport and postal service industries.
With regard to independent regulatory agen-
cies with a sectoral remit, 1996 saw the creation
of the Telecommunications Market Board (CMT
by its Spanish initials) and 1998 that of the Na-
tional Energy Board (CNE) (1). The latter was
entrusted with the electricity market along with
the liquid and gaseous hydrocarbon markets.
As to the measures applied to encourage
the entry of new competitors, these have been
varied, depending on the initial industry posi-
tion. For instance, in the basic telephony sector,
where there was initially only one company, it
was decided to break the monopoly by authoris-
ing a second operator in 1996. However, in the
case of cable telephony, as this was a new ac-
tivity and given the initial advantage of the basic
telephony operator, it was decided to impose a
moratorium on the telephony industry incum-
bent. In the electricity and hydrocarbons indus-
tries, where – despite the absence of entry re-
strictions – there remains a high degree of con-
centration, temporary ceilings were imposed
(June 2000) on maximum market shares (2).
In terms of the means of unbundling the
various segments of activity in a single indus-
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TABLE 1
Price regulation procedures
Procedure Disadvantages Advantages
Return on capital or rate of return:
prices are set so as to enable all costs
to be recovered, including a return on
capital.
There are no incentives to reduce
costs and it may give rise to over-
capitalisation. Moreover, the correct
assessment of costs and determining
the return on capital may prove
difficult.
Facilitates investment and ensures
the financial soundness of the
company.
CPI-X rule: maximum prices are set in
terms of the growth rate of a price
index deducting an amount X, which
represents potential productivity gains.
Does not encourage service-quality
improvements and runs the risk of
curbing investment. Incomplete
information on the part of the
regulator may lead to excessive
profits.
Promotes productive efficiency.
Profit-sharing or incentives: a portion
of profits is earmarked to reduce
(increase) rates if profits exceed (do
not reach) a specific level.
Book profits are difficult to measure. Excessive profits resulting from
incomplete information on the part of
the regulator are avoided.
Referential competition: in the event of
horizontal unbundling, prices are set in
accordance with the actual average
costs of the whole group of firms.
Application requires that sources of
uncertainty be uniform between
companies.
Companies have incentives to
declare and reduce their costs. Cost
cuts translate into price reduction.
(1) In the electricity market, the CNE replaced the Na-
tional Electricity Network Board created in 1994.
( 2 ) Specifically, electricity generators with a share ex-
ceeding 40% may not increase this over the next five years.
And those with more than 20% but less than 40% may not
increase it for three years. Likewise, from January 2003
suppliers of natural gas may not have a market share of
more than 70%. Retail distributors of oil products with a
market share of more than 30% may not, until June 2005,
increase the number of service stations, while those with a
share of more than 15% but less than 30% may not in-
crease it until June 2003.
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try, the situation is also very heterogeneous.
Legal separation is required among the regu-
lated and non-regulated activities of the elec-
tricity and natural gas industries (3), while in
the liquid hydrocarbons industry it is obligato-
ry to separate transport and distribution. As
for the various regulated activities in the natu-
ral gas industry (4), independent accounting
records must be kept. Likewise, there is a
separation of accounts for rail transport in-
frastructure and services; for the universal
postal service and other services under mail
services; and for the various activities per-
formed by the incumbent operators in
telecommunications. The restrictions imposed
on the ownership shares of certain operators
or companies in the electricity and natural
gas industries (5) may also be cited.
In most of the network industries there re-
mains some type of price regulation, with fairly
heterogeneous price-setting procedures. For
natural gas, a regime of maximum prices is ap-
plied which takes into account international
prices, freight and commercialisation costs.
However, in the coming months this procedure
is to be changed to tailor it to costs in the indus-
try. In the case of the electricity industry, the
rates paid by small electricity consumers have
been negotiated, along with other aspects of
the industry, as part of the ongoing and stag-
gered opening up of the sector. As regards
telecommunications, the prices of the main op-
erator are regulated. Since 1 August 2000 the
CPI-X rule has been applied, with certain re-
strictions being imposed on the maximum
changes (upward or downward) that may be
recorded in some of the services included in the
baskets subject to assessment. One basket in-
cludes fixed telephony services and fixed-to-
mobile phone calls. This basket may not ex-
ceed the forecast CPI of minus 9% in the year
2001, and minus 8% in the year 2002. Two ad-
ditional baskets have been established, com-
prising various circuit rental prices. There re-
mains, moreover, a whole range of fixed tele-
phony and line-rental services adhering to a
maximum price regime. As to the Telefónica
fixed network interconnection rate, this must be
adapted to service costs. The regulator periodi-
cally approves interconnection reference prices
of which operators may avail themselves, al-
though they may opt to negotiate other prices
with the incumbent operator. In respect of refer-
ence prices, the CMT takes into account the
recommendations of the European Commis-
sion, which sets a range of rates whose lower
band coincides with the lowest prices applied in
EU countries and whose upper band matches
the third cheapest country (6).
Lastly, universal services have been estab-
lished for mail and telecommunications. In
telecommunications, the universal service has
been awarded exclusively to Telefónica until 1
January 2006 (7). Further, if the universal ser-
vice should entail a net cost for the operator
offering it, the Universal Service Fund shall be
set up, subsidised by all mobile and fixed tele-
phony companies in proportion to their rev-
enue. The obligation to provide the universal
service in postal services (8) falls to Correos y
Telégrafos. This entity has a monopoly on part
of the services (9), while it competes for the
remaining services with the authorised opera-
tors. To finance the universal service a Univer-
sal Postal Service Compensation Fund has
been set up. In addition to the State, private
companies engaging in universal postal ser-
vices contribute to this fund through payment
of rates. The contributions of private operators
are restricted to 20% of the public system’s
needs, the remainder being financed with pub-
lic funds.
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( 3 ) Distribution and transmission are regulated in the
electricity industry while generation and commercialisation
are not. In the natural gas industry the only non-regulated
activity is commercialisation.
(4) In particular for transport-regasification, storage and
distribution.
(5) In the electricity industry in particular, ownership in-
terests have been restricted in the case of both the Market
Operator (the agent entrusted with the management of the
pool) and the System Operator (the agent entrusted with
the management of the transport network) to 10%, for indi-
viduals or corporations, and to 40% in the event of the sum
of shares of parties engaging in activities in the electricity
industry. In the natural gas industry, a ceiling of 35% has
been set for the maximum interest any group of companies
may have in the capital or in the voting rights of the compa-
ny owning the network of gas pipelines and the three re-
gasification plants.
(6) This procedure is a variation on the prices-via-refer-
ence-competition method.
( 7 ) The universal service includes, among other ser-
vices: (i) the right of all citizens to have the possibility of
having a telephone connection, to make and receive nation-
al and international calls and have access to voice, fax and
data transmission at an “affordable” price and one “relative-
ly comparable” across regions; and (ii) the installation of
one public telephone booth in each municipality and one
further booth per 1,500 inhabitants.
( 8 ) The universal service comprises mail transfer (of
funds) services, national and international postal services
for letters and postcards of up to 2 kg. and postal packages
up to 10 kg, and registered and declared value mail ser-
vices.
(9) Particularly on transfers, the international service for
letters and postcards up to 350 g. and registered and de-
clared value mail addressed to general government bodies.
Moreover, it retains the inter-city service for letters and
cards up to 350 g. under privileged conditions, since any
other operator has to set a price for these at least five times
greater than that of the public rate.
4. SOME DIRECT EFFECTS
OF THE LIBERALISATION
AND EXTENSION OF COMPETITION
IN THE NETWORK INDUSTRIES
ON CONSUMER PRICES
One albeit incomplete way of analysing the
incidence of liberalisation on price develop-
ments is through its direct impact on consumer
prices. This section thus analyses the direct ef-
fect on the related components of the har-
monised index of consumer prices (HICP) of
the industries at a more advanced stage of lib-
eralisation (air transport and telecommunica-
tions) or those which, though at a less mature
stage, have recently undergone significant reg-
ulatory changes (electricity). Also, the perfor-
mance of Spanish prices is compared with
those of other euro area countries.
The conclusions drawn from this analysis
should be viewed with substantial caution. First-
ly, it is difficult to isolate that part of the observed
change in price due to liberalisation from that re-
sponding to the incidence of other types of fac-
tors that may have exerted an effect in the same
direction: for instance, technological advances.
Moreover, international comparisons may be af-
fected by the different timing of liberalisation
processes across the various countries. Thus,
while as at 1 January 1998 most EU countries
had liberalised telephony services (10), it took
Spain 11 months more to do so. Likewise, at
present only household consumers in the Unit-
ed Kingdom, Sweden, Finland and Germany
can choose their electricity supplier and, there-
fore, negotiate prices (11). A final word of cau-
tion is in order in connection with certain
methodological aspects relating to the HICP;
these may lead to price falls brought about by
liberalisation being understated. For example,
as is well known, the HICPs only compute in-
formation on households, as a result of which
the impact on corporations, which in many cas-
es entails the biggest effect, cannot be taken
into account under this first approach. Further-
more, the HICP includes information relating to
new operators’ offers with a lag and only takes
into account those directed at the entire popu-
lation, thereby excluding tailor-made rates,
which have been much used in the opening up
of the sector.
Chart 1 depicts the HICP air passenger
transport series for Spain and the euro area.
Moreover, as the opening up of air transport be-
gan in January 1993 and the first HICP figure
available is for January 1996, it was deemed
advisable also to depict the Spanish consumer
price index series for air and sea transport
(12). The aim here was to have some reference
on price developments in the early years of lib-
eralisation (most new operators began offering
services in 1994). As can be seen in this chart,
air rates moderated appreciably in Spain after
the industry was liberalised, and even fell in
1995 and 1996. Since the break in this decline
in rates in 1997, this HICP sub-class has post-
ed higher growth rates than the overall index,
owing perhaps to the dearer price of oil in pese-
tas. As to comparison with the euro area as a
whole, Spanish rates can be seen to have
trended more unfavourably.
Some of the caveats indicated at the begin-
ning of this section are particularly relevant when
analysing price developments in telephony ser-
vices. Competition has led to changes in billing
formulas. For instance, billing per second has
been introduced, the rate for establishing a con-
nection on each call has been eliminated, and
off-peak periods have been extended and dis-
counts applied to specific population segments
or user groups. All this has given rise to cheaper
calls which, in some cases, are not captured, ow-
ing to their construction, in the assessment made
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( 1 0 ) The exceptions include Luxembourg (which com-
pleted liberalisation on 1 July 1998), Ireland and Spain (1
December 1998), Portugal (1 January 2000) and Greece
(31 December 2000).
( 1 1 ) As for the other countries, national timetables to
enable all consumers to choose a supplier are as follows:
Austria, 2001; Denmark and Spain, 2003; the Netherlands,
2004; and Ireland, 2006. Belgium, France, Greece, Italy,
Luxembourg and Portugal only plan to open the electricity
market to big consumers.
CHART 1
Air passenger transport CPI and HICP
Percentage change on year earlier
Sources: INE and Eurostat.
(a) The index depicted is for air and sea transport.
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(12) There is no CPI series that includes only air trans-
port.
via the HICP. Likewise, the HICP may not be
picking up operators’ latest rates.
In any event, as can be seen in the HICP
component relating to telephony and fax equip-
ment and services (see Chart 2), price falls had
begun in this industry before liberalisation, per-
haps in anticipation of heightening competition.
They were followed by rises brought on by the
partial rebalancing of the former monopoly’s
rates (local calls and subscription charges be-
came dearer and other calls were reduced).
Following liberalisation, the biggest falls in this
index took place between the second half of
1999 and the first six months of the year 2000.
Telephony price cuts have been common to the
euro area as a whole. Indeed, since 1997 the
euro-area HICP series for telephony and fax
equipment and services has been posting neg-
ative year-on-year growth rates. As indicated,
the difficulty with an international comparison is
that the introduction of competition has not
been fully synchronised across the member
states. However, the telephony and fax equip-
ment and services HICP has fallen in Spain by
6.3% since December 1998, a slightly lesser
amount than in the euro area.
As regards electricity, rates have undergone
continuous falls since 1997 (see Chart 3), de-
spite the fact that the opening up of the market
has not yet reached household consumers. A
maximum reduction of 9% is expected in the
average rate for the period 2001-2003. In the
euro area, price reductions have alternated with
rises brought on by the introduction of ecologi-
cal taxes. This hinders quantification of the ef-
fects on prices of the opening up of the electric-
ity industry. That said, the cut in electricity rates
for Spanish households has been greater (9.4%
between December 2000 and January 1996)
than for their euro-area counterparts (1.4% for
the same period).
5. EFFECTS ON OUTPUT PRICES
OF LIBERALISATION AND THE
HEIGHTENING OF COMPETITION
IN THE SPANISH NETWORK
INDUSTRIES
As indicated, the direct effect on consumer
prices referred to in the previous section gives a
partial view of the potential impact that the liber-
alisation of the network industries has on the
economy as a whole. Indeed, the use of goods
and services produced by these industries as
inputs in other productive branches set indirect
and second-round effects in train which have a
bearing on overall output prices and, through
this channel, on consumer prices and overall fi-
nal prices.
This section seeks to evaluate the scale of
the potential effect on output prices of a fall of
10% in the prices of goods and services pro-
duced by the network industries undergoing lib-
eralisation: air and space transport; postal ser-
vices and telecommunications; production and
distribution of electricity; production and distri-
bution of gaseous fuels via urban pipelines and
production and distribution of steam and hot
water (including natural gas). The choice of this
figure of 10% should be seen as a point of ref-
erence for assessing the changes that have
taken place in prices in these industries and
those which may arise in the future.
Table 3 offers the results of this exercise,
conducted using the productive structure of the
1995 Input-Output Tables. The first column
shows the decline in output prices in the econo-
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CHART 2
Telephony and fax equipment HICP
Percentage change on year earlier
Source: Eurostat.
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CHART 3
Electricity HICP
Percentage change on year earlier
   Source: Eurostat.
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my as a whole that would come about as a re-
sult solely of the fall of 10% in prices in the re-
lated productive branch. Naturally, the differ-
ences in magnitude observed in this column re-
flect the notable discrepancies in the weight of
the productive branches as a proportion of total
output. To this impact on the branch itself, the
second column adds the price reductions that
would be triggered in the other productive
branches, initially, owing to the cheaper price of
the input that they use in their productive pro-
cesses. The third column shows the overall im-
pact, which includes, in addition to the forego-
ing direct effects, those second-round effects
brought about by the generalised fall in output
prices. Completing this information is the final
column of Table 3, where the results that would
arise if the fall in input prices were not to alter
the proportion accounted for by the remaining
productive factors (labour, capital and taxes) in
the industry’s final price (13).
As can be seen in Table 3, price reductions
in the electricity and telecommunications
branches are those that would most influence
the economy as a whole. This is due to the
weight of these productive branches in total out-
put and, to a lesser extent, to their greater im-
portance as productive inputs in other indus-
tries. A fall of 10% in their prices would lower
the level of output prices in the economy as a
whole (third column of Table 3) by 0.4% and
0.3%, respectively. However, these estimates
might be understating the total effects since,
against a background of heightening competi-
tion, it is reasonable to think that the initial fall in
input costs may prompt a downward revision of
the return on the other productive factors (14),
the proportion of which in the final price would,
as earlier indicated, be maintained. To resolve
this problem an alternative simulation has been
performed in which this last assumption is intro-
duced, obtaining considerably higher total ef-
fects. In this case, a 10% fall in electricity prices
would cause a 1.6% fall in output prices in the
economy as a whole. And a reduction by this
same amount in postal and telecommunications
prices would lead to a corresponding decline of
1.4%. These estimates should be considered
as an upper bound to the potential effect, be-
cause they are obtained under highly optimistic
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TABLE 3
Effects on whole-economy output prices of a 10 % reduction in prices in branches
of activity related to the network industries
Of the branch(a) With the otherbranches (b)
Air and space transport -0.05 -0.07 -0.08 -0.20
Postal services and telecommunications -0.16 -0.24 -0.30 -1.38
Production and distribution of electricity -0.20 -0.33 -0.41 -1.63
Production and distribution of gaseous fuel
through urban channels, except
pipelines, and production and distribution
of steam and hot water -0.02 -0.04 -0.05 -0.17
Rail transport -0.03 -0.04 -0.05 -0.15
Branch of activity Direct
Total (c) Total with
adjustment (d)
Effects (%)
   Source: Banco de España.
   (a)   Direct effect on output pr ices of a 10% reduction in prices in the branch.
   (b)    Direct effect of the branch itself plus the direct effect on the other productive branches.
   (c)   Sum of direct and indirect (second-round) effects.
   (d)   Sum of direct and indirect (second-round) effects when the exercise is performed under the assumption that factor costs that are not
inputs maintain their weight in the final price.
(13) In relation to the gross operating surplus, this as-
sumption means that, following the increase in competition,
the profit margin holds. As regards the compensation of em-
ployees, this hypothesis can be justified if it is considered
that the fall in prices in the economy will translate into fewer
wage demands. In the case of taxes, the assumption would
be in line with the tax burden being maintained.
(14) There are other sources for the understatement of
the estimates presented in the third column. It should be
borne in mind that the productive structure of the Spanish
economy may have changed since 1995, reflecting a more
intensive use of some of the productive inputs subject to
analysis here, this being due to technological advance or to
changes in relative prices. Moreover, the very nature of the
exercise means that the total effect does not compute the
second-round price falls that may come about in the pro-
ductive branch in which the initial fall in prices has arisen.
assumptions, especially as regards the wages
reaction. Therefore, a prudent estimate would
place the final effect somewhere between 0.3%
and 1.4%.
The effects induced by price falls in the other
branches undergoing liberalisation (air and rail
transport and natural gas) are smaller, with total
maximum reductions close to 0.2%.
For some European countries (France, the
Netherlands, Italy and Portugal) the European
Central Bank (ECB) has, using the same
methodology, published the direct effects of a
change in telecommunications and electricity
prices on the other productive industries (see
Table 4). Given a fall of 10% in telecommunica-
tions prices, the Netherlands is the country with
the biggest direct effect (–0.14%), while the fall
in the price of electricity is more significant in
the case of the Portuguese economy (–0.22%).
The differences observed show the different
weights that these branches have as inputs in
the respective economies. The results present-
ed for Spain in this article are at a mid-point in
respect of those estimated by the ECB. For ex-
ample, in the case of the electricity industry, the
impact on the Spanish economy of an exercise
equivalent to that performed by the ECB would
be –0.13% (the difference between the effects
reflected in the first two columns of Table 3),
very close to the results for the Netherlands and
Italy. In the telecommunications industry, the in-
cidence in the Spanish economy is – 0.08%, a
similar result to that for France and Italy.
6. CONCLUSIONS
The opening up of the network industries in
Spain has followed a worldwide pattern involv-
ing the liberalisation of these activities. In the
EU, the process has been driven by the under-
taking to accelerate the creation of the single
market. In Spain, the liberalisation of the net-
work industries has been pursued as a gradual
process that has progressively incorporated the
various segments of each industry, following
pre-set liberalisation timetables and paying
heed to the initial conditions in each of the in-
dustries concerned.
Significant results are already discernible as
a consequence of the progress made in liberali-
sation, and further results will become apparent
in the future. Generally, a notable increase in
the number of participants in these industries is
taking place, which will contribute to increasing
levels of competition. And there are also
widespread reductions in prices, albeit of differ-
ing degrees depending on the industry. In some
cases, such price reductions have been on a
lesser scale than those in other euro area coun-
tries. Headway in reducing the market shares of
the incumbent operators has, generally, been
more limited, although the introduction of new
measures last June will allow progress in this
direction once sufficient time has transpired to
ensure their effectiveness.
The potential effects of the liberalisation of
the network industries on prices in the economy
have exceeded those initially perceived and are
quantified via their direct impact on consumer
prices (such as those mentioned in the preced-
ing paragraph). This is because the use of
goods and services produced by these indus-
tries as inputs in other productive branches sets
in train indirect and second-round effects that
bear on output prices and, in subsequent phas-
es, on final prices.
In particular, both electricity and telecommu-
nications significantly influence the output costs
of other goods and services. The exercises per-
formed with the Spanish economy’s 1995 Input-
Output tables show that a 10% reduction in the
price of each of these industries might alone
entail a fall in the overall level of the economy’s
output prices of around 1%, the scale depend-
ing on some of the assumptions made. Lower
air and rail transport or natural gas prices may
prompt reductions in output prices of some size.
These figures, which are in line with those ob-
tained for other European countries, illustrate
the need to pursue the structural reforms under-
taken in the network industries. The resulting
benefits for the rest of the economy will be
boosted if other obstacles constraining competi-
tion in other markets and services are lifted.
22.3.2001.
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TABLE 4
International comparison (a)
Telecommunications Electricity
Spain -0.08 -0.13
France -0.08 -0.10
Netherlands -0.14 -0.13
Italy -0.06 -0.14
Portugal -0.11 -0.22
Country
Direct effect (%)
   Sources: ECB and Banco de España.
   (a)   International comparison of direct effects of a 10%
reduction in telecommunications and electricity pr ices on
output prices.
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